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MARK J. VALENCIA* and ABU BAKAR JAAFAR**
Environmental Management
of the Malacca/Singapore Straits:
Legal and Institutional Issues-
INTRODUCTION
The constricted, shallow Malacca/Singapore Straits is a priority area
for a coordinated international approach to environmental management
by the principal bordering nations, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore
(Figure 1). Regionwide cooperation could yield a mutually beneficial
distribution of activities, hence, optimal product mixes. Indeed, with the
narrowness of the Straits and the transnationality of the ecosystems,
resources, and activities, effective management strategies may depend
upon the close cooperation of the three nations plus that of extraregional
users. These nations, however, have different perspectives, policies, and
legal systems. The spatial variability of legal regimes, products, and
services may mean national specializations. An incentive system may
result in the active discouragement of some individuals in favor of others,
hence a difficult institutional arrangement. This article explores the trans-
national institutional and legal issues which must be resolved in order to
enhance cooperation in environmental management.
The Malacca/Singapore Straits is a microcosm of the coastal activities
and use conflicts in the region. The Straits are a major transport route
for petroleum tankers. Coastal petroleum exploitation is ongoing off North
and Central Sumatra with exploration off Southwest Thailand and the
Western Malay Peninsula. Coastal depots and refineries are situated in
Port Dickson, Sungei Paking, Dumai, Singapore, and Batam. Bottom
tin mining is ongoing from Phuket northwards, and exploration has been
undertaken off Johor, Malacca, Negri Sembilan, and Penang. Terrestrial
tin mining is scattered throughout the Thai isthmus and the Malay Pen-
insula, and logging activity is significant on Sumatra, all generating much
sediment and contributing to coastal accretion.
In addition to Singapore, the west coast of the Malay Peninsula is
rapidly becoming urbanized. Much of Malaysia's population and indus-
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FIGURE 1.
THE REGION: THE STRAITS OF MALACCA AND SINGAPORE
trial/agricultural processing activity is concentrated there, discharging
wastes into the Straits, including those from disease control. The Ma-
laysian ports of Penang, Port Klang, and Port Dickson, the Indonesian
port of Dumai, and the port of Singapore are situated on the Straits.
Aquaculture is being expanded in North Sumatra and may be developed
in suitable locations along peninsular Malaysia's west coast. Mangrove
harvesting is locally significant throughout the coastal area of the Straits.
Much of the coastal plain of the western Malay Peninsula above the high-
tide mark is under cultivation. Artisanal fishing, including shellfish har-
vesting, is widespread in the nearshore areas. Significant offshore fishing
is conducted in the northern Straits. Tourism/recreation centers bordering
the Straits include Phuket, Penang, Pangkor, and Sentosa. Marine re-
search stations are located at Phuket, Penang, and Singapore.
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Rapidly growing demand exists for the outputs of most of this region's
economic activities. Some market destinations are remote, e.g., for ship-
ping and tourism. Many are more localized, e.g., for fisheries and waste
disposal. Demand growth rates differ so that optimal output mixes may
change over time. Production possibilities are subject to rising marginal
costs in all activities due in part to the compact size of the region. The
Straits are shallow, hazardous to navigation, and characterized by narrow
channels. The nearest substitute for most through navigation is the Sunda
Strait between Sumatra and Java. For Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCCs),
the Lombok Strait off Bali adds considerable mileage, but reduces haz-
ards. The only substitute for fishing near home is to go farther out to sea,
an extension that is now severely limited by maritime claims of other
nations. Tourism, tin mining, hydrocarbons, and waste disposal may have
substitute locations elsewhere but only at cost to the Straits region.
The outputs of the region are clearly competitive in small areas. Log-
ging and agro-industrial waste disposal damage fisheries and tourism;
cross-traffic and fishing vessels may create hazards for tankers in transit
and vice versa. It is not clear, however, that the outputs must be com-
petitive regionwide. Some zoning has already taken place in the form of
different jurisdictional regimes and sea lanes. In reality, the optimal policy'
should call for a general reduction of some activities, a general increase
in competing uses, and certainly some major reallocations within the
region toward subregional specialization. The final measure of success
lies in the positive net changes in the national income of each nation
involved.
CURRENT ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT;
LEGISLATION, CONTINGENCY PLANNING AND THE
TRAFFIC SEPARATION SCHEME
Environmental Policies and Regulations
Policies
The Straits states have yet to harmonize their respective strategies or
specific regulations for marine environmental protection and preservation.
No state has introduced the necessary legislation required by the new
Convention on the Law of the Sea.'
Singapore has adopted a single set of uniform effluent standards.2 Also,
polluters are encouraged to utilize the state-run waste-water treatment
plants.' By utilizing these services, polluters are not required to fully
1. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Doc. A/CONF. 62/122 7 October 1982,
Part XII.
2. Jaafar & V~lencia, Marine Pollution: National Responses and Transnational Issues in MARINE
POLICY IN SoTHEAST ASIA (Kent & Valencia eds.) (to be published by U. Cal. Press, Berkeley).
3. ScIrcE COUNCIL OF SIN APORE, ENvIRoNMENT PRomenoN 1N SnGAPORE: A HANDBOOK (1980).
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treat their waste-water and thus save some costs. Malaysia has introduced
a mixed strategy, issuing two sets of uniform standards for treated sewage
and industrial effluents, and prescribing its agro-based industries, namely,
palm oil and rubber. "Prescribed premises" has a specific meaning under
the Environmental Quality Act: the occupation or use of those premises
or industries must be by a person who is holder of a license issued by
the minister in charge of the Act.4 By prescribing these industries, the
Malaysian pollution control agency, the Division of Environment, has
the power to exercise its many regulatory options, including the control
of production or factory operations, in addition to specifying the condi-
tions of discharge into watercourses or onto land. Other industries or
sources of pollution must comply with standards applicable either to those
discharges within drinking water catchments or to those discharges outside
such areas.'
Indonesia has yet to introduce pollution control regulations. It has,
however, contemplated adopting a multiple-set-of-uniform-standards
strategy by issuing four sets of uniform standards for discharges into four
types of water bodies.6
In short, each country has adopted a different pollution control strategy:
Malaysia, mixed uniform standards; Indonesia, multiple uniform stan-
dards; and Singapore, single uniform standards (with treatment options).
Table 1 compares the specific standards for effluents discharged into
watercourses other than those used for water supply. In comprehensive-
ness and strictness, Singapore ranks generally higher than Malaysia which,
in turn, ranks higher than Indonesia.7
Regulations
Singapore does not have the need to develop pollution control laws to
the extent of its neighbors because of its small size and limited natural
resource base.8 Singapore has been very effective, however, in controlling
pollution in and into its waters. Singapore was one of the first countries
in the region to attempt to control marine pollution, doing so before
attempting to control land-generated pollution.9 Singapore's response to
the dangers of ship-generated pollution is perhaps the most comprehensive
of the three states. By implementing its Prevention of Pollution of the
Sea Act of 1971, Singapore has in effect ratified the 1954 International
4. Malaysian Statutes, Environmental Quality Act of 1974 § 2.
5. Id.
6. Karimoeddin, NationalReport ofIndonesia, ONE WORLD ONLY: INDUSTRIALIZATION AND ENVI-
RONMENT (D. Dielenstein ed. 1973).
7. Jaafer & Valencia, supra note 2.
8. Id.
9. Id.
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Table 1. Effluent Standards for Point Sources or Discharges into Rivers or Open
Watercourses that Eventually Reach the Ocean.
Type of Item of
Waste Analysis Unit Indonesia' Malaysiab Singapore'
Oil Oil and mg/l 100 10 10
grease
Organic BOD5 at mg/1 300 50 50
200C
Total mg/I ns 100 50
suspended
solids
Metals Tin mg/1 ns 1.0 10
Barium mg/I ns 5
Manganese mg/i ns 1.0 5
Arsenic mg/1 1 0.10 1
Metals in mg/1 ns I
total
Chromium mg/1 5* 0.05*
(total) 1
Nickel mg/1 ns 1.0 1
Zinc mg/l 10 1.0 1
Beryllium mg/I ns 0.5
Selenium mg/i ns 0.5
Cadmium mg/1 1 0.02 0.1
Copper mg/l 5 1.0 0.1
Lead mg/1 5 0.5 0.1
Silver mg/1 ns 0.1
Mercury mg/1 0.1 0.05 0.05
Thermal Temperature 0C 45 40 45
Others Total mg/1 ns ns 2000
dissolved
solids
Chloride (Cl) mg/1 ns ns 600
Sulphate SO 4  mg/i ns ns 500
Chemical mg/1 600 100 100
oxygen
demand
Calcium mg/1 ns ns 200
Magnesium mg/l ns ns 200
Iron mg/1 10 5.0 20
Detergents mg/1 ns ns 15
(as methylene
blue)
continued on next page
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Table 1 (continued)
Type of Item of
Waste Analysis Unit Indonesia' Malaysiab Singapore'
pH value 5.5-10.0 5.5-9.0 6-9
Color (LU) ns ns 7
Boron mg/I ns 4.0 5
Chlorine mg/i ns 2.0 1
Sulphide (S) mg/1I 2 0.50 0.2
Phenolic mg/I 0.5 1.0 0.2
compounds
Cyanide mg/1 ns 0.10 0.1
(as CN)
Fluoride (F) mg/I 2 ns ns
Ammonia mg/I 2 ns ns
(free)
Nitrate mg/i ns ns ns
Nitrite mg/i ns ns ns
Note: ns = not specified
* = Cr (VI)
Sources: 'Badruddin Mahbub, Kriteria Mutu Lingkungan HidupAir, RAPAT KERIA NAsIONAL LINGKUGAN
HIDUP 4-5 JAN. 1979. KANTOR MENTERI NEGARA PENGAWASAN PEMBANGUNAN DAN
LINGKUNGAN HIDUP (1979).
bGov'T OF MALAYSIA, supra note 4 at 58-76.
'ScIENCE COUNCIL OF SINGAPORE, supra note 3 at 24.
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil (MARPOL
54). The later amendments to this Convention (MARPOL 69) are effected
by its Civil Liability (Oil Pollution) Act of 1973.0
Malaysia has not ratified any of the relevant international conventions. "
Under the Environmental Quality Act of 1974, however, there are limited
provisions for controlling pollution from vessels. 2 Indonesia has done
little to control vessels which pollute its waters, other than introducing
a specific regulation through the City of Jakarta' 3 to prohibit the discharge
of oil from tankers into waters around the Thousand Islands (Gugusan
10. SCIENCE COUNcIL OF SINGAPORE, supra note 3. These Acts are enforced by the Port of Singapore
Authority (PSA). The authority also provides facilities for the reception, treatment, and disposal of
slops, sludges, dirty ballast, and tank washings at the slop and sludge Reception and Treatment
Centre on Pulau Sebarok.
11. Jaafer & Valencia, supra note 2.
12. Malaysian Statutes, Environmental Quality Act of 1974 § 26(1). Section 26(1) of the Act,
which specifically prohibits discharge of oil in the high seas ("or any part of the seas outside the
territorial waters of Malaysia") is enforceable only for Malaysian-owned vessels and those flying
the Malaysian flag. To what extent the Act may be invalid and unenforceable under international
law remains an open question; Malaysia has yet to promulgate rules and regulations under the Act
in order to effectively enforce Section 26.
13. JAKARTA, INDONESIA REG. No. Bd. 15/4/36/70 L.D. No. 19 (1970).
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Kepulauan Seribu). Although the three states have made uneven progress
in curbing pollution from vessel sources, relatively more progress has
been made in legislation concerning pollution from land-based sources. 4
Also, Indonesia and Malaysia have promulgated regulations to control
pollution from offshore exploration and exploitation.
Singapore. Singapore has the most effective measures in the region
for regulating wastes that reach the marine environment.15 Its sewage
treatment program is illustrative. In 1978, 78 percent of Singapore's
population of two million were served by sewers. The sewage is treated
at the Sewerage Department's treatment works before discharge into the
sea. Some portions of the effluent from the Ulu Pandan Treatment Works
is further upgraded by the Jurong Industrial Works to provide a supply
of industrial processing water to certain factories in the Jurong industrial
area. The department also encourages the siting of new factories in areas
where public sewers are available to receive effluents from the factories
because it is less costly to discharge into public sewers than directly into
watercourses. 16
In Singapore, the amount of wastes from land-based sources which
finally reach the ocean is regulated by the Director of Water Pollution
Control and Drainage of the Sewerage Department. 7 In addition, Sin-
gapore has imposed restrictions on the marine transportation of radioactive
materials under its Radiation Protection Act of 1973. The Act provides
for the regulation and control of the importation, manufacture, sale,
disposal, transport, keeping, and use of radioactive materials and irra-
diating apparatus.' 8 With a narrow strip of territorial waters, Singapore
has little prospect of discovering oil and gas offshore and thus no need
for pollution regulations in this regard. Singapore is actively engaged,
however, in near-shore excavation and coastal-land reclamation. Appar-
ently, there are no environmental regulations governing these activities.
Malaysia. Malaysia has quite comprehensive legislative regulation of
waste releases from land-based sources.' 9 Malaysia has yet to develop,
however, a complete set of regulations for controlling wastes flowing
directly into the marine environment. Malaysia's Environmental Quality
Act of 1974 (EQA) is a major piece of environmental legislation regulating
14. Jaafer & Valencia, supra note 2.
15. Id.
16. SCIENCE COUNCIL OF SINGAPORE, supra note 3.
17. A maximum fine of S$5,000 may be imposed for the discharge into a watercourse of industrial
effluent or treated sewage which does not meet the minimum standard of quality specified in the
Trade Effluent Regulations of 1976. Also, the discharged effluents must not contain pesticides or
radioactive materials.
18. SCINCE COUNCIL OF SINGAPORE, supra note 3. The Act is now administered by the Radiation
Protection Department of the Ministry of Science and Technology.
19. Malaysian Statutes, Environmental Quality Act of 1974.
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releases of wastes from all sources except those of mining, offshore
exploration and exploitation, agriculture, logging, and earthworks.2" Un-
der the Act, three sets of waste regulations (not listed above), namely,
palm oil factories, natural rubber processing plants, and sewage and other
onshore manufacturing industries, have been introduced.2 Waste disposal
from mining operations is regulated by state authorities but relegated to
the Federal Department of Mines.2"
The control of silts and sediments due to soil erosion and earthsurface
runoff is exercised under four separate laws. The Land Conservation Act23
has been adopted throughout peninsular Malaysia. The Act seems, how-
ever, to have been virtually without effect thus far because it vests broad
discretion in state authorities to declare or not to declare a given tract of
land should not be cleared or planted with shortterm crops.24 The Local
Government Act of 197625 also has provisions for the local authorities to
prohibit certain discharges within their areas of jurisdiction. In addition,
the Street, Drainage, and Building Act of 1974 empowers the authorities
to issue city bylaws for the control of silt washed away due to improper
drainage and improper maintenance of streets.26
Proper drainage and frequent maintenance of logging tracks are some
of the practices required in accordance with various Forests Enactments
enforced by respective state authorities. Also, in accordance with the
Waters 'Enactment, the state authorities can alienate sufficient riparian
reserves to prevent inroads of silt into receiving streams and rivers.2 7
The Pesticides Act of 1974 provides for the regulation of the import,
manufacture, sale, and storage of pesticides but has no provision for
regulating the use of pesticides.28 In practice, however, the various state
authorities can prohibit the use of certain pesticides which directly affect
the beneficial uses of any inland waters, subterranean water resources,
20. Id.
21. These are Environmental Quality (Prescribed Premises) (Crude Palm Oil) Regulations, 1977-
P.U.(A)342; Environmental Quality (Prescribed Premises) (Raw Natural Rubber) Regulations, 1978-
P.U.(A)338; and Environmental Quality (Sewage and Industrial Effluents) Regulations, 1979-P.U.(A)12.
22. This is in accordance with the Mining Enactment-Federated Malay States (FMS) Ch. 147
(1929) and its counterpart state legislation. As a matter of practice, effluent limitations in terms of
suspended solid content not to exceed 800 grains per imperial gallon (or equivalent to 11,320 parts
per million, ppm) or grain size not to exceed 150 mesh are specified as conditions set forth in mining
leases issued by state authorities following consultation with the Drainage and Irrigation Department
and the Mines Department.
23. Malaysian Statutes, Land Conservation Act of 1960, No. 3, which was enacted under the
authority of MALAYSIAN CONST. art. 76(3).
24. SHANE, LEGAL ASPECTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT IN MALAYSIA, UN TASKFORCE ON
THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT 44 (1977).
25. Malaysian Statutes, Local Government Act of 1976, §§ 69 & 70.
26. Jaafer & Valencia, supra note 2.
27. Rashid, The Environmental Law in Malaysia: A Survey, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY
IN THE PACIFIC BASIN AREA 12-14 (Kato, Kumamto & Matthews eds. 1981).
28. Malaysian Statutes, Pesticides Act of 1974; SHANE, supra note 24.
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and any water in an estuary or sea adjacent to the coast of their respective
jurisdictions.2 9 For instance, the State of Perak has banned the use of
sodium arsenite as a herbicide.3"
For controlling pollution arising from offshore exploration or exploi-
tation activities, the Petroleum Mining Act of 1966 empowers PE-
TRONAS, the Petroleum Authority, to specify conditions in any exploration
license. The conditions provide that the licensee shall take all steps prac-
ticable to prevent the escape of oil or waste of petroleum discovered in
the exploration area.3' Although there is no legal requirement for stipulated
oil content level in the effluent from the offshore platforms, standard
industrial practice in other parts of the world has been adopted and im-
posed by PETRONAS.32
Radioactive waste disposal is not totally prohibited under the sewage
and industrial effluents regulations because its limits are yet to be specified
by the minister in charge of the environment.33 Under the Radioactive
Substances Act, 34 however, the Minister of Health is the authority in
charge of regulating most aspects of the manufacture, storage, sale, and
use of radioactive substances and the safe disposal of radioactive wastes.35
Indonesia. Indonesia has accomplished little in the control of wastes
from land-based sources. Indonesia took the first step in 1936 with the
issuance of a use of water resources regulation which encompassed the
disposal of industrial wastes in public streams. 36 Other relevant laws37
require further improvement, especially the disposal of harmful wastes,
and standards to eliminate harmful wastes from established industries.38
Although the legislative standards have not been fully developed, In-
donesia has taken other measures to handle the disposal of human waste.
Except for Bandung, Jogjakarta, and Medan which all have waste treat-
ment plants and sewage systems in certain parts of the cities, septic tanks
connected to seepage pits are used widely in most urban areas. 39 Addi-
tionally, the Department of Industry, in collaboration with the Department
"29. This State's provision appears principally as a new section 7A of the Waters (Amendment)
Enactment of 1970.
30. Jaafar & Valencia, supra note 2.
31. Revised in 1972; L.M. ACT 95, in accordance with its section 7(5).
32. The set limit for oil is 50 ppm, the level that is considered achievable and acceptable in
Malaysia; Lau, Oil Pollution Preventions and Controls in Hydrocarbon Exploitation, Offshore Ma-
laysia, TENAGA '80 THE MALAYSIAN NATIONAL CoMMrrIEE OF WORLD ENERGY CONFERENCE (1980).
33. Malaysian Statutes, Environmental Quality Act of 1974.
34. Malaysian Statutes, Radioactive Substances Act of 1968.
35. These rules are now known as the Radiation Protection Rules of 1974.
36. ALGEiEEN WATRREGLEMENT (PERATURAN PERAIRAN UMUM, 1936) Dat STABLE 1936 No.
489 jo. StLE. 1949, No. 98.
37. The Nuisance Ordinance (1926) and its Amendment (1940), and the Safety Law No. 1 of
1970. Karimoeddin, supra note 6.
38. Jaafar & Valencia, supra note 2.
39. Id.
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of Health, uses established technical guidelines to evaluate alternative
waste disposal systems for industrial wastes." Pesticides are comprehen-
sively regulated in Indonesia."
Indonesia has the most detailed legislative and regulatory provisions
dealing with oil pollution arising from offshore exploration and exploi-
tation activities.42 The existence of these comprehensive provisions in
Indonesia is appropriate because Indonesia is a major offshore oil pro-
ducer. The new anti-pollution supervisory unit within the Oil and Natural
Gas Directorate of the Department of Mining is responsible for the en-
forcement of these provisions.43 Oil pollution research is being done by
a study group on pollution at the Institute of Oil and Gas and the State
oil company, PERTAMINA. The company also coordinates all activities
connected with oil pollution.
No provisions for mandatory environmental impact assessment for off-
shore exploration and exploitation activities exist on the remedial side.
Little has been done to develop a system of civil liability for oil pollution
damage resulting from these activities.' The apparent policy of the In-
donesian government is that marine pollution by oil originating from
offshore operations should not be covered by international conventions.
The Indonesian government believes that such matters are of purely na-
tional concern and can be dealt with by the public authorities and the
concerned oil companies."5 Indonesia has introduced laws, regulations,
and rules for controlling the transport and use of radioactive isotopes,
and for preventing the danger of the associated radiation.'
40. Karimoeddin, supra note 6.
41. Presidential Decree No. 7, 1973, concerning regulation of distribution, storage, and use of
pesticides; Directive from the Minister of Agriculture No. 201/Kpts/Um6/1973 concerning the
application of procedure for pesticide registration and use approval; Directive from Minister of
Agriculture No. 429/KptslUrn/9/1973 concerning conditions for pesticide packaging and labelling;
Directive from Minister of Agriculture No. 437/KptsIUmI 1/1975 concerning registration and ap-
proval of pesticide use; Directive from Minister of Agriculture No. 125/KptsIUmI411975 concerning
registration and approval of pesticide use; Directive from Minister of Agriculture No. 20lKpts/MP/
5/1975 concerning directory of offices regulating distribution, storage, and use of pesticides.
42. The earlier legislative measures against pollution were through the enforcement of the fol-
lowing laws and regulations: The Storage of Oil Ordinance of 1927; The Mine Policy Regulations
of 1920; and The Basic Mine Law of 1967. The later provisions are Presidential Decree No. 17,
1974, concerning regulation of offshore oil and gas exploration and exploitation (LN No. 20, 1974,
TLN No. 3031); and Directive from Minister of Mines No. 04/P/MIPertamb/1973, concerning
prevention and control of water pollution arising from exploration and/or exploitation of oil and gas
activities.
43. Johnston, Environmental Management in the South China Sea: Legal and Institutional De-
velopments, EAST-WEST ENVIRONMENT AND POLICY INSTITuTE RESEARCH REPORT 70 (1980).
44. Jaafar & Valencia, supra note 2.
45. Id.
46. Law No. 31 of 1964 concerning the basic decision for the development of atomic energy
(LN No. 124 of 1964); Presidential Decree No. 33 of 1965 concerning the Atomic Energy Assembly
and the National Atomic Energy Board (LN No. 88 of 1965); and Presidential Decree No. 5 of 1969
concerning the use of radioactive isotopes and radiation (LN No. 18 of 1969, TLN No. 2892). There
is no mention, however, of how the used radioisotopes are to be handled.
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In general, Indonesia has not developed supporting regulations to ef-
fectuate its existing laws.47 The lack of any followup of its environmental
laws, despite the fact that there have been some efforts to formulate rules
and standards, is quite understandable. Indonesia has not changed its
longtime position that the environmental problems of poverty are not less
acute and certainly are more widespread than the environmental problems
caused by affluence.48 For this reason, there is no single central govern-
ment agency in Indonesia that is wholly responsible for pollution control.
Since the establishment of the Ministry of State for Development Su-
pervision and Environment in 1978, 4" there has been some effort to in-
tegrate the environmental element in the country's socioeconomic
development strategy. Unfortunately, the power of this ministry is limited
to the coordination of environment-related activities and the formulation
of general environmental policy and guidelines. The regulatory powers
are still in the hands of sectoral agencies."
CONTINGENCY PLANS
51
National Plans
In Indonesia, as an intermediate step prior to the establishment of a
national contingency plan, the Directorates General of Sea Communi-
cation and of Oil and Gas cooperated in the formulation of "Permanent
Procedures on Marine Pollution Control in the Malacca-Singapore Straits"
(PROTAP). The procedures were effective September 18, 1975, within
the limits of the Indonesian territorial sea in the Straits.
Singapore has developed an "Emergency Plan to Combat a Major Oil
Pollution Disaster." Its principal function is to ensure that sufficient stocks
of floating booms, skimming devices, and detergents are available and
ready for delivery to the site of the emergency. Procedures are set forth
to cover major pollution events, including collisions and groundings, as
well as to deal with fire hazards. Operations of each unit have been
defined and coordinated within, the system, and a sophisticated manual
for all personnel involved has been developed. 2
The Malaysian plan assumes that daily traffic through the Straits will
increase beyond the present level of 140-150 vessels. An anticipated
47. Jaafar & Valencia, supra note 2.
48. Karimoeddin, supra note 6.
49. Renamed the Ministry of State for Population and Environment.
50. Jaafar & Valencia, supra note 2. For example, the Department of Industry, the Department
of Public Works, Energy and Electricity, the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Transport,
the Department of Mining, and the Department of Public Health.
51. For an expanded treatment of contingency plans, see the source of this information: Finn,
Hanayama, Meimandi-Nejad, Piyakamchana, Reeves, Oil Pollution from Tankers in the Straits of
Malacca: A Policy and Legal Analysis, 6 East-West Center Open Grants Papers (1979) [hereinafter
referred to as Finn].
52. Port of Singapore Authority, Marine Emergency Action Procedure (n.d.).
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increase in oil volume transshipped through the Straits will raise the
probability of casualty to more than 25 percent per year. The plan de-
scribes the serious consequences of accidents and sets forth a plan of
action calling for the establishment of three area headquarters-at the
port of Johore Bahru (South), Port Kelang (Center), and the port of Penang
(North) each headed by an Area Coordinator (the Harbour Master).53 Each
area would be self-sufficient in equipment, facilities, and trained person-
nel. In case of a minor oil spill, the area coordinator would be responsible
for all control efforts. When major oil spills occur, however, the Royal
Malaysian Navy, assisted by the area coordinators as needed, would take
charge. A plan of operation is spelled out, responsibilities are designated,
and the required equipment is listed. An essential requirement of suc-
cessful implementation of this plan is speed of action to prevent oil from
reaching the vulnerable beaches and mangrove forests along the coast-
line. 4 Malaysia's contingency plan calls for handling and cleanup of oil
by mechanical means. The use of dispersants is reserved for cases of
absolute emergency because the chemicals used to disperse oil are con-
sidered hazardous to the aquatic biota.
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Contingency
Plan
The intent of the ASEAN Contingency Plan was not to duplicate na-
tional efforts but to coordinate and integrate the efforts of the member
countries. The plan provides for effective reporting to alert member coun-
tries, creating awareness of the antipollution capabilities of the member
countries, and rendering assistance in operations where and when nec-
essary. The capabilities of each member country are recorded, and contact
points are established within each country so information can be dissem-
inated rapidly and requests for assistance dealt with efficiently.5 Potential
pollution problem areas are described, including high density shipping
lanes, offshore oil exploration and production centers, coastal tourist and
recreational areas, fish spawning areas and fishing grounds. The plan also
records the location of resources for marine oil pollution control and shore
reception facilities, as well as information on winds, currents, tides, and
53. Malaysia Ministry of Science, Technology and Environment, Straits of Melaka Contingency
Plan at 2 (n.d.). The Ministries of Defense, Communication, Agriculture and Rural Development,
and Foreign Affairs; the Departments of Royal Customs and Excise, Marine Police, and Immigration;
and five resident oil companies (Esso, Shell, Caltex, BP, and Mobil) cooperated with the Ministry
of Science, Technology, and Environment in formulating the contingency plan for the Malacca Strait.
The plan was endorsed by the Malaysian Cabinet in June 1976.
54. Finn, supra note 51, at 92.
55. Id. at 91. The contact points are Jakarta: Directorate General of Sea Communications; Kuala
Lumpur: Directorate General of Environment; Manila: National Operations Center for Oil Pollution;
Singapore: Port of Singapore Authority; and Bangkok: National Environment Board.
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other meteorological data. It describes operational procedures, recom-
mends appraisal of operations after each incident, and provides for review
and amendment of the plan with the concurrence of all member countries,
as the need arises. Additional suggestions include the establishment of
an ASEAN Marine Pollution Control Center at Manila or Singapore, and
the opening of the plan to interested non-ASEAN parties as associate
members.56
The Malacca-Singapore Straits Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS)
The Malacca TSS consists of three elements-Traffic Separation Schemes
(TSSs), Deep-Water Routes (DWRs), and accompanying Rules. 8 TSSs,
consisting of a separation zone and two traffic lanes, have been imple-
mented at One Fathom Bank, in the Singapore Strait, and at the Horsburgh
Light area. DWRs have been established within the eastbound lanes of
the TSS in the Strait of Singapore (Figure 2). This scheme was approved
56. Id. at 92.
57. On November 14, 1977, the Trafic Separation Scheme for the Straits of Malacca and Singapore
(Malacca TSS) was approved by the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO)
(now the Intergovernmental Maritime Organization) (IMO) and implemented on May 1, 1981; Finn,
supra note 51.
58. IMCO Doc. MSC XXXVII/4 (16 Sept, 1977).
Rules implemented for all vessels include:
1) Deep-draft vessels, i.e., those with a draft of 15 m. or more, and VLCCs, i.e.,
tankers of 150,000 dwt and above, are to allow a UKC of at least 3.5 m. "at all
times during the entire passage through the Straits..."
2) Masters of such vessels are to take all necessary safety precautions especially when
within TSSs, and are advised to consider navigational constraints when planning
their passage through the Straits.
3) Local pilotage services are recommended for such vessels when they are within
the TSSs, when such services become available.
4) More specifically, COLREGS 72, Rule 70, requires:
a. Deep-draft vessels and VLCCs are required to use certain DWRs and other
vessels are instructed to avoid them "as far as practicable;"
b. Deep-draft vessels are advised to use a DWR between Buffalo Rock and Batu
Berhanti;
c. Deep-draft vessels in the DWR are instructed to avoid overtaking, "as far as
practicable;"
d. All vessels in TSSs are required to move in the general direction of traffic in
the lane and maintain as steady a course as possible consistent with safe navi-
gation;
e. Westbound vessels approaching Raffles Lighthouse in the strait of Singapore are
advised to take caution and required to give way to deepdraft vessels approaching
from Phillip Channel;
f. VLCCs and deep-draft vessels are advised to maintain a speed of no more than
12 knots;
g. All vessels navigating in TSSs are required to maintain a safe speed, proceed
with caution, and be in a maximum state of maneuvering readiness;
h. VLCCs and deep-draft vessels in the Straits are advised to participate in the
voluntary ships' reporting system, in which they would give information con-
ceming their characteristics, speed, and times of passage through critical areas
eight hours prior to entry into the TSSs.
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by the Intergovernmental Maritime Organization (IMO). 9 Although the
regional states initially opposed any IMO intervention in the creation of
a TSS for the Straits, they are now apparently willing to pursue inter-
national avenues for resolution of the problems." The method pursued
by the regional states in adopting a TSS for the Straits is fully in accord
with the provisions of the Convention on the Law of the Sea under which
states are encouraged to make regional responses to environmental prob-
lems, subject to approval by relevant international organizations.6' Adop-
tion of the Malacca TSS by IMO creates an enforceable obligation for
vessels to conform to the TSS.62
The Malacca TSS is an incomplete instrument for eliminating the prob-
lem of environmental pollution resulting from the transshipment of oil
through the Straits by tankers, or even the more specific problem of
casualties resulting from collisions and groundings. The TSS at One
Fathom Bank is too narrow and runs through an area with a heavy con-
centration of fishing vessels.63 Also, there is concern that shallows within
the route in the Singapore Strait are dangerous for certain vessels. The
Straits contain a significant volume of crossing traffic and fishing activity.
Frequently vessels that do not conform to the general movement are
present in the traffic lanes .' Even for those vessels moving in one direction
within the defined lanes, the volume of shipping alone will result in many
vessels in very close proximity, proceeding along slightly different courses
at different rates of speed. Overtaking and crossing will, therefore, con-
tinue. Even in the case of Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCCs) and other
deep-draft vessels navigating in DWRs, overtaking is not completely
prohibited.65 The under-keel clearance (UKC) concept may prove inad-
equate to prevent groundings because the movements of the bottom in
the Straits will create unexpected shallows.
The rules of the Malacca TSS are qualified and, as such, unlikely to
create consistent observance of clear standards. Overtaking and the pres-
ence of nondeep-draft vessels in the DWRs are to be avoided only "as
far as practicable. "' Strict observance of designated courses and bearings
59. Jaafar & Valencia, supra note 2.
60. Finn, supra note 51, at 85.
61. UNITED NATIONS, supra note 1, at art. 41.
62. Finn, supra note 51, at 85; COLREGS 72 sets up a system for the establishment of obligatory
traffic separation schemes and revises rules for safe navigation practices and navigational signals.
The status of the MalaccaTSS is, therefore, enhanced by its direct enforceability through the domestic
legislation of the contracting states to the Convention on International Regulations Preventing Col-
lisions at Sea (COLPEGS 72), and by its indirect effect on liability in cases of nonobservance of the
TSS.
63. Jaafar & Valencia, supra note 2.
64. Jaafar, Prospects for Marine Regionalism in the Malacca and Singapore Straits 117 (Ph.D.
Dis., U. Hawaii 1984).
65. Finn, supra note 51, at 86.
66. Id.
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is not required, even within traffic lanes. Masters are advised to be in a
state of readiness for delicate maneuvering but no additional radio contact
requirements have been adopted.67 Reporting in the case of passage of
VLCCs and deep-draft vessels is voluntary. Continuous reporting of po-
sition within the Straits is not required. No special equipment is required
that would not otherwise be mandated under general international stan-dards, and no special crew training or certification is necessary. Pilotage
is voluntary.
Improvement of navigational aids in the Straits, although they have
and presumably will continue to lower the frequency of casualties, will
not ensure the elimination of major casualties. Even though there areboth conceptual and practical difficulties in adopting more sophisticated
systems of vessel regulation, such systems should be considered.
LEGAL ISSUES
Harmonization of Legal Regimes
On November 16, 1971, the governments of Indonesia and Malaysiadeclared jointly that the Strait of Malacca was not an international water-
way, while Singapore only took note. 68 Later, the coastal states established
a common front in dealing with the maritime powers. An agreement
between the littoral states on navigational safety in the Straits of Malacca
and Singapore was reached on February 24, 1977. The joint declaration
of 1971 and the Safety Agreement of 1977 raised critical questions ofinternational law regarding the status of portions of the Straits.
Indonesia and Malaysia have declared 12 nautical mile (nmi) territorial
seas and 200 nmi Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs). Indonesia also hasdeclared archipelagic waters. 9 Where the breadth of the straits is more
than 24 nmi, the jurisdictional regime of the Straits is divided between
territorial waters and EEZs (Figure 3). In the narrow parts of the Straits,Indonesia might consider its parts as archipelagic waters. These regimes
may apply to navigation until the Convention on the Law of the Seabecomes international law. Thus for navigation, two legal regimes may
apply in three different regions: innocent passage in territorial seas,70
transit passage in the EEZ,7" and innocent passage or sealane passage in
archipelagic waters.72 The new Convention, when ratified, will defini-
67. Id.
68. Leifer & Nelson, Conflict ofInterest in the Straits of Malacca, 49 INT'L AFFAIRS 190, 191,
194 (1973).
69. On the basis of the 13 December 1957 Djuanda Declaration, Indonesia promulgated its
archipelagic baselines in 1960. See UNITED NATIONS, supra note 1, at Parts II, IV, and V for a full
explanation of States rights and duties in these zones.
70. UNITED NATIONS, supra note 1, at art. 45.
71. Id. at art. 41.
72. Id. at art. 52-53.
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tively change from innocent passage to transit passage the navigational
regime of the parts of the Straits less than 24 nmi wide."3 The geographic
extent of the transit passage regime depends on the geographic definition
of the Straits and not on distance from baselines.
Thus, under the new Convention, the Straits of Malacca and Singapore
could qualify as "straits used for international navigation" with the regime
of transit passage. Part III of the Convention, however, provides that
transit passage is the freedom of navigation and overflight solely for the
purpose of continuous and expeditious transit of the strait between one
area of the high seas or an EEZ and another area of the high seas or an
EEZ.74 Part III does not apply to straits used for international navigation
if the high seas route or a route through an EEZ of similar convenience
exists through the straits. The Malacca/Singapore Straits do link the EEZs
of Indonesia and Malaysia in the northern half of the Straits and the South
China Sea (Figure 3). Vessels transiting the Straits immediately after
leaving the Horsburgh Lighthouse area, however, may be heading for
Indonesia's archipelagic waters, not Malaysia's EEZ. The maritime pow-
ers argue that there is no alternative route through the maritime region
of similar navigational and hydrographical convenience.75
According to the Convention, in the EEZ and straits used for inter-
national navigation, states bordering the straits cannot suspend passage
which is continuous and expeditious.76 The Straits states may be able,
however, to introduce regional regulations to enhance navigational safety
in the Straits and to safeguard the marine environment from vessel pol-
lution as long as the regulations do not affect vessel design or con-
struction.77 Such regulations should be worked out first by the states
concerned, in consultation with the competent international organization
such as IMO. Passage of vessels which are likely to cause or threaten
major damage to the marine environment may be suspended by coastal
states because the passage of such vessels may be considered "not in-
nocent." To what extent violations of any of the regulations jointly in-
troduced by the Straits States constitute threats of "major damage to the
marine environment" will depend on the interpretation of Convention
Article 233: "if a foreign ship ... has committed a violation of the laws
and regulations ... causing or threatening major damage to the marine
environment of the straits, the States bordering the straits may take ap-
propriate enforcement measures. "78
73. Id. at art. 35.
74. Id. at art. 38.
75. Finn, supra note 51, at 127.
76. UNITED NATIONS, supra note 1, at art. 38.
77. Id. at art. 43.
78. Id. at art. 233.
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The littoral states have attempted to establish a Memorandum of Un-
derstanding with the major maritime states to interpret Convention Article
233. For the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, any violation of the 3.5
meter under-keel clearance (UKCV)79 constitutes a "threat that can cause
major damage to the marine environment." The Memorandum, however,
is silent on the other rules adopted by IMO in its resolution relating to
the safety of navigation in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.80 Cer-
tainly the coastal states have "no power to prohibit the passage of any
tanker for violating the [under-keel clearance] (UKC) requirement."'"
Nevertheless, the legal status of this interpretive statement is presently
unclear because the Convention is not yet in force.
The right to regulate pollution from vessels in the EEZ falls to flag
states.82 According to Convention Article 211, however, coastal states
may designate special areas in the EEZ for the protection of the marine
environment against pollution. In such areas, coastal states may exercise
three options: complete prohibition of passage, detour, or through passage
with complete prohibition of any discharge.83
Harmonization of Coastal State Perspectives
Although the joint declaration that the Straits were not an international
waterway reflected common interests, "the initiative was more a product
of Indonesian than of Malaysian priorities." 4 Indonesia was more con-
cerned with questions of national integration and internal security as
manifested by its archipelagic declaration, often challenged by extrare-
gional entities, than with that of pollution from foreign vessels in the
Straits.85 Sukarno had long argued that Indonesia would not become strong
or secure unless the whole Strait was under Indonesian jurisdiction.86 The
Djounda declaration on the archipelagic concept included the Malacca
Strait. Indeed, Indonesia may have considered it a sacrifice to treat the
Straits of Malacca and Singapore as a unit because Singapore would have
some input in Malacca Strait management which it previously did not
have.
79. The distance between the lowest part of the hull of the ship and the channel bottom.
80. Finn, supra note 51, at 85.
81. Yatim, Problems of Pollution in Malaysia, 2 MALAYAN L.J. (1978); Yatim, Law of the Sea
and Related Legislations, paper presented at the National Seminar on the Protection of the Marine
Environment and Related Ecosystems, Kuala Lumpur (1979); Yatim, Straits of Malacca and Sin-
gapore in International Law (Ph.D. Dis. Univ. of Kent, 1979).
82. UNITED NATIONS, supra note 1 at art. 217.
83. Id. at art. 211(6).
84. Liefer & Nelson, supra note 68, at 191.
85. Finn, The Marine Environment and Maritime Security in Southeast Asia: Controlling Oil
Tanker Traffic in the Strait of Malacca, XXXIV NAVAL WAR COL. REV. 49 (1981).
86. YAmIN, NASKAN PERSIAPAN UNDANG-UNDANG DASAR 1945 1. (Jakarta, 1959).
January 1985]
NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL
To Malaysian negotiators and some others at the Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) it has always been
clear that Indonesia would rather concentrate on pursuit of international
recognition of its archipelago principle than on negotiating an innocent
passage regime for the Malacca/Singapore Straits. Throughout the nine
long years of negotiations at UNCLOS III, Indonesia did not insist on
innocent passage provisions in archipelagic waters, and remained for a
long time contented with the newly introduced concept of transit passage
in archipelagic waters as well as in straits used for international navi-
gation.8 7
Non-archipelagic states, like Malaysia and other straits states, were
left with the task of clarifying the exact rights of coastal states in straits
used for international navigation under the new regime of transit passage.
For the Malaccca/Singpore Straits, Malaysia took the lead as coordinator
of the "straits states." Japan acted on behalf of the major maritime states," 8
holding a series of meetings for the purpose of interpreting the meaning
of Article 233 in its application to the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.
"Malaysia was more directly concerned with the [control of] navigation
and the prevention of pollution" in the Straits.89 According to Malaysia's
former Solicitor General Zakaria, "the problem confronting the Straits
is basically the question of the safety of navigation."' At the Second
Session of Plenary Meetings of UNCLOS III, the Chairman of Malaysia's
delegation to the Conference reiterated that Malaysia "was very conscious
of the grave danger of marine pollution ... so little importance seemed
to be attached to the security and other legitimate interests and concerns
of coastal states, which should not be expected to bear the cost of damage
to their marine environment caused by pollution and accidents.""
Singapore's concerns were for local defense, security, and navigational
freedom for all big powers. Such navigational freedom would effectively
neutralize individual great power influence and also the power of any
potentially dominant regional state. Second, the oil refining industry in
Singapore was built on the assumption of free transit for the most modern
tankers of any size.92 This is why the Singapore government only took
note of the. common position of Indonesia and Malaysia when the In-
donesian and Malaysian governments agreed that the Straits of Malacca
87. POLOMKA, OCEAN POLrTCS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (1978); Jaafar, supra note 64, at 199.
88. France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Norway, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America.
89. Leifer & Nelson, supra note 68, at 193.
90. Yatim, supra note 81.
91. UNITED NATIONS, THIRD UN CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA. I OFFICIAL RECORDS.
(New York, 3-15 Dec. 1973; Caracas, 20 June-29 Aug. 1974); the Straits are fast becoming one
of the world's dirty maritime backlanes, remarked a Malaysian delegate to the Conference.
92. Logaraj, Navigational Safety, Oil Pollution, and Passage in the Strait ofMalacca, 20MALAYAN
L. J. 287-307 (1978).
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and Singapore are not international straits. The original positions of the
states on the UKC were consonant with those different perspectives (Table
2).
Table 2. Proposals for Limiting the Under-Keel Clearance for Deep Draft Ves-
sels.
Factor Indonesia Malaysia Singapore
Squat (m) 1.9 2.0 1.0
Wave action or swell 0.5 0.5 0.5
Safety margin 1.0 1.0 1.0
Human error 1.0 1.0 nil
Necessary clearance required 4.4 4.5 2.5
Source: April PETROLEUM NEWS [SEA] I 1 (1976). GOv'T OF SINGAPORE, Safety of Navigation in the
Malacca-Singapore Straits. TECHNICAL GROUP MEETING OF EXPERTS (1975).
National vs. International Priorities and Standards
The development of specific legal regimes to implement the Convention
on the Law of the Sea has moved from the global (Table 3) to the regional
and bilateral level. Some regimes possibly could be discriminatory and
in excess of those required by international agreement. Although there is
some danger that a regional approach will lead to excessive regimes, a
regional approach may be preferable to a proliferation of individual ex-
cessive claims. A regional scheme may lead to the development of ef-
fective and efficient marine management more responsive to regional
needs.
The Convention appears to bar any action, unilateral or regional, by
coastal states to impose requirements in excess of those of the vessels'
flag states on vessels in passage near their shores. A number of devel-
opments, however, suggest that in the future reasonable action against
vessel-source pollution may be possible for coastal states, especially when
acting in regional groups. There have already been a number of unilateral
assertions of jurisdiction over vessel polluters, both by coastal (Canada)
and port states (United States).93 Many states have made unilateral claims
to special purpose zones which exceed those recognized by the Conven-
tion."4 "Creeping jurisdiction," by which stricter regimes and total claims
are extended further from shore, has been the trend of the decade. It is
not certain that this trend has been forestalled by the Convention. Such
93. Finn, supra note 51, at 106.
94. E.g., the military warning zones of Vietnam and North Korea, territorial seas beyond 12 nmi
by the Philippines and Peru.
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Table 3. Important Global Treaties Dealing with Ship-Generated Marine Pol-
lution and the Marine Environment.
Convention
Jamaica Convention
1954 OILPOL and its 1962,
1969, 1971 Amendments
MARPOL 1973 and its 1978
Protocol
1969 Civil Liability
Convention and its 1976
Protocol
1971 Fund Convention and
its 1976 Protocol
1972 London Dumping
Convention and its 1978
Amendments
CL??? Explore and Exploit
1977
COLREGS 1972
STWC 1978
Description
Stipulates obligation of States to protect and preserve the marine
environment. Also, various articles elaborating provisions for global
and regional cooperation, technical assistance, monitoring and en-
vironmental assessment, international rules, and national legisla-
tion to prevent, reduce, and control pollution of the marine
environment, enforcement, safeguards, and responsibility and li-
ability.
Provides for prevention of pollution of the sea by oil; will be
replaced by MARPOL 1973.
Comprehensive attempt to control operational discharge from ship-
ping, establishes operational discharge standards for all substances
except radioactive materials and requires certain equipment to achieve
them, e.g., segregated ballast, and record keeping and enforce-
ment.
Provides for liability of a ship owner for all pollution damage
caused in the territory or in the territorial waters of another con-
tracting state by oil which has escaped or has been discharged
from his ship.
Provides for compensation for damages not compensated by Civil
Liability Convention.
Prohibits discharge of oil within certain zones from ships over a
certain size and completely for ships over 20,000 dead weight tons
(DWT), and calls for waste reception facilities in ports and the
installation of equipment to prevent operational pollution.
Provides for civil liability for oil pollution damage resulting from
the exploration and exploitation of submarine resources.
Sets up a system for the establishment of obligatory traffic sepa-
ration schemes and revises rules for safe navigation practices and
navigational signals.
Establishes standards of training.
extensions of jurisdiction for, e.g., fisheries management, may become
more acceptable when they are accompanied by a genuine regionalization
of resources or when they do not simply amount to a restrictive claim
unaccompanied by sound management practices and efficient utilization
of the resources in question.9" When pollution problems are involved,
especially those regional in nature or amenable to regional solutions,
jurisdictional regimes stricter than those provided for in the Convention
may become acceptable if linked to a sound regional program of envi-
ronmental management. Following are some specific examples of legal
issues which may arise:
95. Finn, supra note 51, at 108.
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1. Spatial Interference with Transit Passage
To what extent do offshore mining rights prevent freedom of navigation,
and do states' rights over the resources of the continental shelf prevail
over other states' rights in the water column? Exploration and exploitation
by Malaysia for offshore tin and by Indonesia for offshore hydrocarbons
could reduce the area necessary for transit passage in the Straits. Article
78(2) of the Convention says that coastal States must not cause "any
unjustifiable interference with navigation and other rights and freedoms
of other States .. "96 The interpretation of "interference with naviga-
tion" may be developed cooperatively by the Straits States.
2. Innocent Passage and Transit Passage: Where do they Apply?
Where is the regime of innocent passage applicable, and where is the
transit passage regime applicable? For example, a Burman boat operated
by Thai nationals smuggling tin ore was caught by Malaysian Customs
officials outside the designated lanes of the traffic-separation scheme at
the One Fathom Bank. The case was brought before a magistrate in the
District of Klang, Selangor.97 The magistrate must first establish whether
the passage was innocent. The prosecution's argument hinges on the
geographical position of the boat at the time of arrest. The boat should
have been proceeding expeditiously in the lanes if the intention was to
transport in transit passage the ore from Thailand to Singapore. The coastal
State does not have the right to impede transit passage.98 The coastal
State may maintain, however, that innocent passage applies outside the
traffic lanes. The case should help clarify where in the Straits the rights
of coastal states end and those of flag states begin.
3. Extension of the Traffic Lanes
Because the traffic scheme exists only in critical places,99 should the
traffic lanes be extended throughout the whole length of the Straits? The
coastal states are wary of establishing continuous traffic lanes as these
might be construed by the maritime powers as "high seas corridors" in
the Straits. Also, such a scheme might adversely affect cross-channel
traffic. On the other hand, it might provide coastal states an opportunity
to establish, based on vessel position in the Straits, dual-pollution stan-
dards for vessel discharges. Under such a scheme, all vessels outside the
traffic lanes and all occasional users would have to comply with national
standards, whereas international standards would apply to those vessels
96. UNITED NATIONS, supra note 1, at art. 78(2).
97. New Straits Times 9 (Sept. 12, 1982).
98. UNrrED NATONS, supra note 1, at art. 38.
99. One Fathom Bank, Philip Channel, and Horsburgh Lighthouse.
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in the traffic lanes or to those vessels which continuously use the Straits
for through passage. A violation of national standards could constitute
"a threat to the marine environment." Such passage might not be con-
sidered innocent and could be suspended."°
4. Duties of Port States
Port states have full control over all vessels within their port limits.' 0
A difficulty arises when a port state refuses to admit a vessel that is not
clean. The tendency is for these vessels to leave the port area and to
discharge their dirty ballast in the Straits where the rights of flag states
prevail over those of coastal states, or where the enforcement capability
of the coastal states is deficient. A second difficulty arises when the port
state refuses to take action against a vessel which has violated international
law or the laws of another coastal state, for instance, by willful pollution.
5. Traffic Management
Although it may reduce the incidence of vessel casualties, the Malacca
Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS) is unlikely to eliminate casualties be-
cause the Straits are so narrow, congested, and shallow in spots. Addi-
tionally, traffic will steadily increase. 10 2 Coastal states' efforts to promote
more sophisticated systems, however, may be met by user objections
regarding cost, reliability, effectiveness, and safety. Their legality also
may be challenged, due to interference with flag state jurisdiction, im-
position of charges, and invalid equipment requirements.
Advanced vessel traffic systems (VTS) impose external supervision and
control on vessel movements, ranging from surveillance and monitoring
of position to actual control of courses, speeds, and other vessel move-
ments. Under VTS, navigational instructions are issued to the vessel
master, but the actual navigation of the vessel remains the responsibility
of the master, subject to the advice received from VTS dispatchers.'0 3
Arguably, VTS could be imposed on vessels in transit passage because
such systems could actually enhance the passage rather than interfere with
it, and also protect the environment. The cost of additional equipment
and the required crew time may not be unreasonable when compared to
the safety and environmental problems of the Straits.
VTS, however, could require communicational capacity and other
equipment in excess of that presently carried by vessels and required by
general international agreements."4 Language difficulties could muddle
100. UNIrD NATIONS, supra note 1, at art. 233.
101. Id. at art. 218.
102. Finn, supra note 51, at 108-09.
103. Id. at 110.
104. Id. at 109.
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the communication necessary for reliable VTS. Traffic in the Straits is
dense and complex in pattern and vessel types; an inadequate or unreliable
VTS could produce chaos in crowded traffic conditions. VTS could require
a level of coastal state control over vessel movements and a level of
disclosure of possible sensitive information about vessel activities, cargo,
and characteristics which might be unacceptable to major private users.
Also, VTS may be perceived as a prelude to further restrictions such as
statements of ownership prior to use, and financial responsibility require-
ments.
Imposition of VTS costs on users would also present a legal problem.
Under existing international law, charges may not be levied on foreign
ships for the privilege of passage. 5 The Convention, however, provides
that charges may be imposed on ships passing through territorial waters
as payment for specific services rendered to those ships. '06 Imposition of
costs for VTS services which are provided from a remote point could
result in navigational interruptions if a payment scheme did not involve
contact between coastal authorities and the vessel master.
6. Restrictions on Tanker Operations: Prohibited Zones
Restrictions on tanker movements and operations could be employed
to prohibit tankers altogether from hazardous or sensitive areas, to restrict
their navigation in such areas, or to impose more stringent requirements
concerning operational discharges in sensitive areas. The Convention
validates these procedures when they are undertaken to prevent damage
to waters where ecological conditions create "special circumstances.""07
In the Malacca/Singapore Straits, the TSS already significantly defines
the appropriate traffic lanes for tankers. There is little room in the narrow
portions of the Straits to restrict tanker operations any further.' 8
Nevertheless, tankers navigating through hazardous or key ecological
areas could be required to carry local pilots, have tug escorts, or contin-
uously report their positions. Technically, such restrictions on tanker
movements and operations could not be imposed unilaterally. Requiring
tugs or local pilots in certain areas of the Straits probably would be
opposed because of the costs and administrative and navigational incon-
venience. "t
Operational discharges already are illegal in most parts of the Straits"0
because the International Convention on the Pollution of the Sea by Oil
105. Id. at 110.
106. UNITED NATIONS, supra note 1, at art. 26(2).
107. Id. at art. 211(6).
108. Finn, supra note 51, at 110.
109. Id. at 111.
110. Id.
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(MARPOL 69) continues the MARPOL 54 requirement that discharges
cannot be made within 50 miles of land.' Additional restrictions on
operational discharges could be considered for those places where dis-
charges are still allowable. Additionally, discharge regulation in areas
outside the Straits where discharges would be likely to influence the
environment of the Straits, including some parts of the Andaman and
South China Seas, could be supplemented.
7. Tanker Safety Standards: Special Design and Equipment
Requirements
The possibility that coastal states might attempt to impose tanker design
and equipment requirements has been one of the main concerns of mari-
time powers." 2 Nevertheless, valid design and equipment issues exist.
The Crude Oil Washing System (COW) has been accepted as an adequate
substitute for Segregated Ballast Tanks (SBT) on existing vessels, even
though COW will lead to continuing operational discharges which would
have been eliminated by requiring SBT. ' 3 The world oversupply of tanker
tonnage makes it probable that vessels without SBT will continue to
operate for the foreseeable future. In addition, the 1978 Convention on
Safety of Life at Sea, which is not yet in effect, provides for collision
avoidance radar systems (CAS) that will significantly enhance the navi-
gational capacity of tankers in congested traffic. "4
The primary objection to regional implementation of such requirements
has been that conflicting standards could be created by allowing different
regions to impose unilateral design and equipment requirements. " 5 States
which are contemplating unilateral imposition of such requirements prob-
ably would examine the provisions enacted by other states and confer
with these states to develop adequate and uniform standards. Even if there
were conflicting standards, a vessel equipped with the best available
technology would probably meet all of the standards, or at least could
demonstrate that its design and equipment features would be adequate to
comply with the differing regulations.
8. Double-standards
If the same vessels pursue the same routes on a continuous basis, and
meet the strictest standards along the route, the vessels would satisfy all
111. Id.
112. Alexander, The Costs of Failure at the Third Law of the Sea Conference, 9 J. MARrr. L. &
Co,%tm. 1, 27 (1977).
113. Carter, Amoco Cadiz Incident Points Up the Elusive Goal of Tanker Safety, 200 SCI 514,515
(May 5, 1978).
114. Finn, supra note 51, at 111.
115. Id.
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standards along the route. Such standards might be applied only to vessels
that regularly navigate through the Straits; vessels that only occasionally
transit the Straits could be exempted altogether. If fear of a mosaic of
different standards could be removed, the validity of imposing such stan-
dards may hinge on their reasonableness. A modification of the double-
standards approach would be to combine design and equipment standards
with alternatives for vessels which do not or cannot conform to the
regulations, such as requiring a tug escort having specified aggregate
horsepower in relation to the tonnage of the tanker. This tug escort re-
quirement might not significantly increase the costs of navigation.
9. Imposition of Charges
Because oil pollution in the Straits is supposedly largely the result of
activities of extraregional interests, 1 6 the coastal states may eventually
wish to impose pollution costs on the users. Under the risk-assessment
approach, vessels are charged fees based on the chance they will pollute
and the probable extent of that pollution." 7 Both are functions of vessel
design and equipment. Thus, the risk-assessment method of charges would
allow vessels exemption from special design and equipment standards,
and would also encourage compliance with such standards because of the
costs of nonconformance. "18
Imposition of a charge is of dubious legality if the charge is not related
to services provided by the coastal states."' Because there is a risk that
vessels will cause significant pollution in the Straits, the Straits states do,
or will, provide a range of services including navigational aids, contin-
gency capacity in case of spills, and various administrative functions. 20
10. Increased Liability and Compensation Requirements
Virtually all oil tankers which use the Malacca/Singapore Straits are
covered for losses by the Tanker. Owners' Voluntary Agreement on Lia-
bility for Oil Pollution (TOVALOP) and the Contract Regarding Interim
Supplement to Tanker Liability for Oil Pollution (CRISTAL). A significant
number also are covered by the Civil Liability Convention (CLC), and
will be covered by an International Fund for Compensation of Oil Pol-
lution Damage (FUND) as well.' Whereas CRISTAL and FUND cover
costs not recoverable under TOVALOP and CLC, injuries resulting from
116. Id. at 115.
117. Id. at 112.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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damage to resources that are not privately owned 122 are not recoverable.
The coastal states might enact alternative or supplemental liability and
compensation regimes.
Special national liability rules and limits, as well as compensation
systems which differ from the international ones, would cause difficulties
for vessel operators. Insurers may be unwilling to provide coverage in
amounts above the general international limit. They may hesitate to write
strict liability policies or policies covering situations in which liability
would not arise under the existing international regimes. A provision
under the pending amendment to CRISTAL would indemnify operations
for liability imposed under local law which exceeded international limits.
In addition, an amended CRISTAL provision would provide for doubling
of the CRISTAL fund to $72 million upon agreement of the parties to
CRISTAL, although this money could not be applied to previous inci-
dents.123 Also, the CRISTAL fund could be supplemented as necessary
by "calls" for oil company contributions to cover claims which would
significantly reduce the available fund.
Legally, regional adoption of special rules or limits of liability must
be considered separately from the creation of a special regional compen-
sation fund. Enforcement of special rules or limits of liability would be
difficult to achieve without direct action against vessels, 124 including their
seizure and subjection to the regional states' domestic court jurisdiction.
In the absence of an international agreement, under which these states
agree to apply such special circumstances, courts in flag and port states
would be unlikely to recognize special rules or limits of liability applying
to their vessels or to vessels which are found in their ports. "z
Special rules or limits of liability could be applied indirectly, however,
by keying payments out of a special compensation fund to the rules and
limits of liability that are adopted regionally. The chief problem in the
creation of a special compensation fund again would be that present
international law does not recognize the competence of coastal states to
impose charges for passage. 126 Arguably, such charges would, in effect,
be charges for future services such as cleanup operations, or indemnifi-
cation of pollution victims. The charges would be keyed to operational
plans which do not exceed international standards. Creation of a special
fund to receive such fees would lessen the suspicion that such charges
were being used merely to raise revenue or for an invalid regulatory
purpose. Special regional liability rules, enforcement of a higher limit of
122. Open seas fisheries, or general ecological damage.
123. Finn, supra note 51, at 113.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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liability, and a special fund to pay cleanup costs and indemnify damages
would be difficult. The higher limits would provide bargaining power to
encourage more rapid and satisfactory payment of claims.
Such problems are illustrated in the case of the Showa Maru. '27 After
the Showa Maru accident on March 8, 1975, the Singapore government
claimed that the Taiheiyo Shipping Company, owner of the tanker, owed
it 3.6 million Singapore dollars ($1.4 million, U.S. dollars) for the dam-
age it had suffered. On April 7, 1975, the company paid S$1 million for
direct governmental expenditures for oil removal, and in late June 1975
paid an additional S$.52 million for the cost of oil removal by the private
sector. Claims amounting to S$2.1 million for compensation of private
damage, however, never were settled. The Indonesian government claimed
the company owed it U.S.$24 million, and the Malaysian government
claimed U.S.$9.5 million. At the beginning of 1977, the company paid
U.S.$1.2 million to Indonesia, and U.S.$0.5 million to Malaysia. Most
of the unsettled claims are earmarked for damage to fisheries. The tanker
company and insurance company do not acknowledge that the damage
was as large as claimed.
11. Required Contingency Plans
A great part of the Straits oil pollution problem is attributable to the
activities of outside users.'28 These users might be required to carry out
contingency planning and to develop a capacity to respond to contingen-
cies as a condition of their use of the Straits. An attempt, however, to
condition use of the Straits on developing and implementing contingency
plans is perhaps contrary to the existing principles of unimpeded passage
under the transit passage regime. 2 9 Further, enforcement of such a re-
quirement necessarily must proceed via direct action against vessels which
do not comply.
INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES AND OPTIONS
The Straits states should review their environmental laws and update
their rules and regulations to implement the relevant provisions of the
Law of the Sea Convention.
This action would provide necessary stimulus to harmonize the laws
of the three states. It would ground the common position of the littoral
states in international law should a dispute arise with the users, and could
lead to improved pollution control from all sources. This action also
127. Id. at 114.
128. Id. at 115.
129. Id..
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would benefit the users in the sense that discrepancies in the interpretation
of various provisions in the Convention by different nations would be
reduced. Foreign users would know the rules.
On the other hand, given that the littoral states may have other priorities
relating to their general economic development, there is a real question
of timing, i.e., how soon such laws and regulations could be put in place
and enforced in each country. Once these regionally accepted laws are
established, pressure may build from environmental groups and inter-
national organizations for increased effective enforcement. Uniform stan-
dards would limit flexibility in approach commensurate with different
priorities, stages of economic development, and carrying capacities of
different sections of the environment.
Singapore might view such a development favorably because Singapore
has only a small area of responsibility. Also, uniform standards would
limit the actions of the other littoral states and make their actions more
predictable, creating a stable regime for vessel traffic of benefit to Sin-
gapore. Singapore, however, as the major flag and port state, would have
more requests to take action against vessels on the basis of complaints
received from its neighbors. Also, Singapore could lose the business
engendered by substandard vessels which would, by the upgraded stan-
dards, be prohibited from the Straits.
Indonesia would benefit most from fees received for pilotage and other
services rendered because most laden tankers travel more in waters under
Indonesian jurisdiction (Figure 3). Indonesia, however, would have a
large area to police. Moreover, Indonesia generally prefers to allow the
private companies to assume responsibility, in accordance with best com-
pany practice. Also, Indonesia would have to upgrade its own fleet at
great expense to meet the standards.
Malaysia would favor the pollution control improvement in its "front
yard."'13 Substandard Indonesian fleets would be forced to upgrade, and
Malaysian trade with Indonesia would improve because such vessels
would no longer be prohibited from Malaysian ports. Malaysia could also
impose fees for its port services. On the other hand, Malaysia may have
to bear capital costs for facilities such as slop and sludge reception and
treatment at its major port, if these facilities were not centralized among
the states. Malaysia would have the second largest area to control, and
would be constrained from enacting rules stricter than international stan-
dards. Japan, as the major external user for through traffic, should favor
such a development. Diversity and uncertainty would be reduced, because
the rules could not exceed international standards.
130. Jaafar, supra note 64, at 216.
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The Straits states could harmonize their practices and reconcile their
pollution control regulations for major common pollutants.
Harmonization of pollution control practices and regulations could ul-
timately benefit all states. The states would be required to reexamine the
rationale for their laws and to develop new ones or modernize and stream-
line those which are outdated and disconsonant. Any differential in foreign
investment resulting from diversity in environmental legislation could be
reduced as could any attendant conflict. Similarly, harmonization could
avoid conflict due to one country's pollution damaging resources shared
by all three. Harmonization could eliminate the question of which must
control its pollution first, and could strengthen the legal position of each
state vis a vis external users.
On the other hand, the countries are at different developmental stages
and, therefore, presumably have different environmental protection prior-
ities and capabilities for enforcement. Furthermore, uniform laws and
standards preclude a differential approach within the country. The uni-
formity could create disharmony between marine and land area environ-
mental laws.
Singapore probably would support harmonization of pollution control
practices and regulations. Singapore has the strictest effluent standards
of the three. 3' Although Singapore would benefit, through increased
tourism and enriched fisheries, from a cleaner environment in the Straits,
it probably would not want to pay to control pollution from sources not
indigenous to Singapore, other than tanker traffic.
Malaysia might favor the arrangements because its "front yard" could
be cleaner as a result. It may be determined, however, that Malaysian
industry, agriculture, and mining contribute most of the land-based pol-
lutants and that further pollution control may economically constrain these
industries. Further, Malaysia might have to introduce and/or upgrade a
few standards to match those of Singapore. Malaysia's choice of emphasis
on pollutants and geographic areas of control could thus be limited.
Correlation of land and marine environmental laws also would be nec-
essary.
Indonesia probably would not favor this approach because its laws are
the fewest and its standards the weakest of the three states. In effect, its
priorities, its Dutch-based legal system, and its regulations would be
strongly influenced by its economically better-off, British-influenced
neighbors. Further, Indonesia has the largest area of responsibility and
the most pollutants most difficult to control, such as siltation from ex-
tensive logging. Most importantly, Indonesia has the only oil and gas
131. Logging, offshore oil and gas exploration/exploitation and tin mining.
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production in the Straits. Because oil and gas are the mainstay of the
economy, Indonesia may believe that its development should not be ham-
pered in any way.
The Straits states could agree to ratify or accede to major
international conventions of environmental relevance dealing with
shipping and with dumping.
Advantages would include uniformity, strengthening the states' claims
to compensation if damaged, and to the availability of the international
machinery the necessary upgrading of their own laws, and a resultant
cleaner environment. Disadvantages include the preclusion of indepen-
dent action, including the prohibition of standards stricter than interna-
tional standards; the cost and process of the increased enforcement and
research; and the perceptual surrender of authority to IMO to approve
the various implementations. Positive positions of the littoral and user
countries on this possibility likely will be influenced by the same factors
mentioned in relation to harmonization of environmental practices and
regulations.
The Straits states could develop a joint contingency plan for the
Malacca Strait.
It remains unlikely that effective contingency operations can be mounted
for the Straits because of 1) an insufficiency of personnel and equipment,
2) the usual administrative difficulties which are compounded by the
necessity for close cooperation, and 3) a lack of adequate financial sup-
port. High magnitude contingencies in the Straits are almost always the
result of activities of outside users. 32 Establishment of a regional gov-
ernmental scheme to coordinate all contingency efforts could ensure that
the responses of external and resident private parties are not in conflict
with the response of the regional states themselves. Also, declaring that
users, either governmental or private, have an obligation to develop a
contingency capacity in cooperation with the regional states could stim-
ulate increased financial assistance of technical support for such measures
both by governments and industrial associations.
Thus, such a declaration would enhance coordination and preparation
for transnational spills, make more resources available for response, and
strengthen and serve as a focal point for assistance. This action could
reduce confusion and conflict engendered by immigration and customs
laws if men and material must be moved across borders to combat a
transnational spill. Conflicts resulting from spills in one country's sector
moving into or damaging resources in another country's sector may be
132. Finn, supra note 51, at 115.
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reduced, and the environment would be cleaner. Some countries, how-
ever, may not want to maintain equipment and trained personnel at the
level required by the contingency plan. Sovereignty concerns and sus-
picion may arise when the marine police or navies of the countries are
involved in the cleanup.
Singapore could derive more business from support facilities and equip-
ment sales. Japan and Singapore together might feel that if there is prompt
cleanup, there will be less likelihood that Malaysia and Indonesia will
be stimulated to enact further regulations which may inhibit traffic in the
Straits. Japan could be liable for fewer costs for cleanup after a spill by
one of its flag or owned tankers.
On the other hand, Singapore may feel that it would be more efficient
to deal by itself with spills in its or adjacent waters; accidents are more
probable in Indonesian waters; and, in any case, the industry should bear
the cost of contingency plans. Malaysia may share this view, but could
also consider the benefit derived from covering Indonesian offshore oil
and gas exploration/exploitation in the contingency plan. Indonesia may
not favor such a scheme because its monetary priorities are on devel-
opment. Indonesia may believe that the private sector should be respon-
sible for contingency plans. Indonesia does have the largest area of
responsibility, however, and could thus benefit from the input of its
neighbors.
The Straits states could establish a Compensation Fund and its
operating principles.
The coastal states have established a Revolving Fund, wholly contrib-
uted by Japan,133 amounting to 400 million yen. The Fund will be used
to meet the initial expenditures urgently required when an oil spill in-
volving Japanese tankers occurs. The interest on the Fund is used to pay
its administrative and operational costs. 134
In view of the limitations or shortcomings inherent in this and other
established funds such as FUND/CLC/CRISTAL, and TOVALOP, the
three Straits states may consider establishing a regional compensation
fund. The advantages of such a joint fund are that a larger multinational
fund could draw more matching contributions from external users; the
operating principles could be designed more sympathetic to ecological
damage not covered by conventional funds; and conflict could be avoided
by sorting out the allocation of contributions beforehand and once only.
Singapore in particular, however, might view such a scheme uneco-
nomic and unnecessary because of the existing international funds. The
133. The ratio is 75% public to 25% private financing. The Indonesian Observer (Feb. 25, 1979).
134. A Revolving Fund Committee consisting of a representative from each of the three States
administers the fund; the committee is situated in Indonesia until 1986.
January 1985]
NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL
fund might appear inefficient because of potential management, allocation
of contributions, and compensation conflicts. Independent action might
be preferred.
Allocation of Contributions for Contingency Plans and Compensation
Fund
If the coastal states must raise the funds, possible bases for allocation
for costs and responsibilities include: 1) risk; 2) geography; 3) economic
position; and 4) benefits derived from the Straits. Whereas allocation of
costs for the contingency plan might place more emphasis on risk, country
contributions to the compensation fund could place more emphasis on
geography, i.e., the value of resources at risk. Any criteria acceptable to
all three states likely will be a hybrid. Here the criteria are examined
separately.
1) Risk
Risk allocation could include, first, a breakdown between risk of spills
from oil exploration/exploitation and that from tankers. Risk from tankers
could further be assigned among external flag, transiting tankers and local
flag, or traffic. Further consideration could be given to factors influencing
tanker safety and extent of any spill: age, tonnage of oil carried, draft,
and frequency of use.
On this basis, Indonesia may have to pay a larger share because of its
older, more substandard fleet and because it is the only country in the
Straits with present oil exploration/exploitation. Singapore also may have
to pay proportionately more because more of the vessels using the Straits
bear its flag or call at its port.
2) Geography
Allocation on the basis of geographic factors could include consider-
ation of coastline length, area of Straits under a country's jurisdiction,
relative hazard in each country's area, and the value of resource at risk
including livelihoods likely to be adversely affected. Singapore obviously
would pay less than its neighbors if coastline length or area of jurisdiction
were the criterion. If relative hazard in each country's jurisdictional area
were the criterion, Singapore would pay more.'35 If resources at risk or
people affected were the criteria, Malaysia would pay more to clean up
its "front yard" than would Indonesia with its rural Sumatran coastline.
Tiny Singapore would pay the least.
135. Finn, supra note 51, at 18 (Figure 2.5).
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3) Economic Position
The United Nations often bases its suggested contributions to its various
operations on economic position such as Gross National Product per
capita. On this sole basis; Singaore clearly would be obligated to pay
most. Indonesia would contribute the least.'36
4) Benefits Derived
Some countries benefit more from polluting uses of the Straits than
others. For example, much of Singapore's economy is based on the
refining of oil imported and exported on ships using the Straits. Singapore
also relies on ship repair and construction, as well as logistics supply for
the oil industry. Malaysia obtains considerable free benefit by allowing
land-based pollutants from its west peninsular coast industry, agriculture,
and mining to freely enter the Straits, avoiding the cost of pollution
control. All three states remove fish from the Straits, and Malaysia and
Singapore derive some tourism/recreation benefits as well. Although con-
siderable land-derived pollutants enter the Straits from Indonesia, Indo-
nesia probably would have to pay less than the others on the basis of
derived benefits.
5) The three states could develop a common methodology for
assessing impacts.
The methodology could include baseline surveys and resource, risk,
and damage assessments at pre- and post project development stages as
well as accident impact. Such investigations could be planned and/or
coordinated internationally but implemented on a national basis. Navi-
gational aids also could be maintained and funded on a regional basis as
suggested by the Convention.'37
6) The three states could cooperate in the monitoring, surveillance,
and enforcement (MSE) of the Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS).
The existing lanes and traffic cut across national jurisdictional zones.' 38
The interest drawn on the established Revolving Fund could be used to
finance the MSE of the TSS. The methods and procedures could be
coordinated among the littoral states. The actual MSE, however, could
be implemented on a national basis. If funds are not sufficient for MSE
implementation, allocation of costs could become an issue. Alternatively,
136. GNP/Capita is: Singapore, $4,340; Malaysia, $1,560; Indonesia, $450. CENTRAL INTELLI-
GENCE AGENCY, TnE WORLD FACrBOOK (1982).
137. UNITED NATIONS, supra note 1 at art. 43.
138. See Figures 2 and 3.
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the Straits states might wish to solidify contributions from user-states,
including extra-regional flag states. Such allocation might be made on
the basis of the location of relative risk. Singapore might oppose cost
allocation on the basis that the locus of most risk, and of past accidents,
is in waters under Singapore's jurisdiction.139
CONCLUSION
While Malaysia continues to be concerned about navigation and pol-
lution in the Straits, Indonesia remains concerned with the security aspects
of its archipelagic claim, and Singapore with the big power balance and
free transit. Geography and stage of development also influence their
respective positions. Clearly, the disparate perspectives of the Straits
states militate against joint action for the sole purpose of environmental
protection. Other sectoral uses of the Straits, however, may also require
management, including fishing, hydrocarbon exploration/exploitation, se-
curity, and transport. 40
Perhaps a package arrangement, involving intersectoral trade-offs be-
tween the three, would provide an opportunity for enhanced order in the
multi-national, multipurpose use of this constricted and crowded water-
way. A first step might be the formation of a tripartite, multi-ministerial
level task force to review the conflicts in and between all use sectors in
the Straits and to make recommendations to the three governments for
further action. Eventually, the three states might form an organization to
manage the activities and uses of the Straits (a Malacca and Singapore
Straits Management Authority-MASSMA). The organization might take
various forms: existing organizations, a regional organ, a joint commis-
sion, or a joint authority. Indeed, this range of organizational types could
be considered as an evolutionary sequence.
ASEAN has relevant committees and groups already formally estab-
lished, recognized, and supported politically and financially by the ASEAN
member countries.14 ' These groups have an administrative structure, ex-
perience, and a system of international communication. Their use could
avoid new organizational stress with its delicate questions of management
responsibility.
The coastal states, however, view the problems of the Malacca/Sin-
139. Finn, supra note 51, at 18 (Figure 2.5).
140. Jaafar, supra note 64.
141. ASEAN has committees on Trade and Communication (COTAC); Science and Technology
(COST); Food, Agriculture and Forestry (COFAF); and Energy and Minerals (COIME); and under
COTAC, the Expert Group on Marine Pollution, under COST, the Expert Group on the Environment,
under COFAF, the Expert Group on Fisheries, and under COIME, the ASEAN Council on Petroleum.
All these bodies could include an element of the management of the Malacca/Singapore Straits in
their deliberations and activities.
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gapore Straits as their responsibilities, not those of ASEAN. Further,
these ASEAN committees and groups are not integrated and can only
recommend action to the national governments. Their terms of reference
and members include all of ASEAN and thus Malacca/Singapore Straits
matters would have to compete with other regional matters for attention
and resources. Further, under the ASEAN format, there is no international
technical support for these bodies which are mainly comprised of poli-
ticians or administrators.
Other options among existing organizations are the Council on Safety
of Navigation and Control of Marine Pollution in the Straits of Malacca/
Singapore, formed in 1971, or the Tripartite Committee.'42 The Tripartite
Committee has been used successfully in the past by the three countries
to negotiate with Japan on Straits safety and to provide technical support
for these negotiations. '43 These organizations have been relatively inactive
but could be reactivated. They do exist on paper and, unlike the ASEAN
bodies, focus specifically on the Straits. Additionally, the organizations
encompass only the three littoral countries. They deal, however, solely
with tanker shipping and were initially formed with a political objective
in mind, not specifically to manage all activities in the Straits.
A regional organ could be structured similar to the United Nations,
i.e., it would have a governing council of policymakers and a secretariat
for technical support. The secretariat might be divided sectorally into
shipping,'" fisheries, non-living resources, pollution/environment, and
security. Management of the environment of the Straits could be the
common theme. The organization would centralize policy and provide
some stability and predictability to management of use of the Straits. It
also could have links with other international organizations. Its recom-
mendations, however, similar to those of the UN, would not be binding
on its members. Individual governments would approve policies affecting
them. Additionally, there also would be issues of budget, cost, and its
allocation.
A joint commission would be given a legal mandate by the three
governments to research and recommend options for action. The com-
mission would be more independent than a regional organ, having its
own arbitration machinery to settle differences. The commission would
include representatives of the general citizenry and industry as well as
government. Technical support would be ad hoc. The individual govern-
ments would set the agenda for the body. Governments probably would
142. Finn, supra note 51, at 76.
143. Id. at 77.
144. This division might include the existing Council and the Tripartite Committee.
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be reluctant, however, to surrender their control over the process and
pace of policy recommendations affecting their interests.
The most idealistic option would be a joint authority modelled after
the existing Thai-Malaysia Joint Development Authority. '45 It would have
a ministerial rank, intergovernmental, policymaking assembly, and an
executive branch with five organs: environment, shipping, fisheries, non-
living resources, and security. The decisions or findings of the assembly
would be binding upon the member governments. Indeed, formation of
such a Ministerial Council was discussed at Tripartite meetings, but has
not materialized.'46
How would the joint authority work in practice? For example, devel-
opment of hydrocarbon resources in the Straits could interfere with other
activities such as fisheries and shipping. Such development might even-
tually either be constrained by protests of neighbors, or engender use and
user conflict, thus reducing the total benefits of the Straits available to
all three states. Therefore, the country with jurisdiction over the hydro-
carbon resources would pay the authority to manage their development,
enhancing conflict avoidance. Of course, for this system to work, gov-
ernments must yield management control over activities in the Straits.
Also, the joint authority, without checks and balances, could become
very powerful, even more powerful than the individual states. On the
other hand, because the authority would combine the political power of
the three states, it would be a formidable negotiator with extraregional
users of the Straits. Additionally, the states would draw, without the
responsibility of management, both the short and long term extra revenues
and other benefits of orderly development and conflict management.
Certainly the activation of such an authority would require enormous
political will and advance subsidies. The need would have to be obvious
and urgent. Because it is not so perceived, and political and economic
priorities of the coastal states are disparate and presently focused inward,
away from the Straits, further steps toward joint management await a
more compelling and auspicious climate.
145. Harun, The Malaysian Philosophy of Joint Development in SouTm CHINA SEA; HYDROCARBON
POTENTIAL AND JOINT DEVELOPMENT (M. VALENCIA ED.).
146. Personal communication with M. Thilagadurai, Director of Maritime Division, Ministry of
Transport, Malaysia (1984).
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